Migration has become structural

In 2024, immigrants accounted for about 13% of the population in the EU27. In the EU14 countries, where most immigrants live, the share of the population that is foreign-born rose from 12.1% in 2015 to 15.5% in 2024, corresponding to more than 12 million additional foreign-born residents. This means that roughly one in six residents in these countries was born abroad.

The change was not uniform across countries. Malta and Cyprus experienced very large increases in their migrant share. Ireland, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland also saw sizeable growth. By contrast, the migrant share changed only marginally in France, Italy, and Denmark, remained broadly stable in Greece, and declined slightly in Latvia and Lithuania (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 Migrant share in 2015 and 2024 across European countries

This cross-country heterogeneity matters. It shows that there is no single European migration experience. In some countries, immigration has rapidly reshaped the demographic structure. In others, the change has been more gradual. But the overall pattern is clear: in most Western European labour markets, immigrants are no longer a marginal group. They are a permanent and sizeable part of the workforce.

Absolute progress, limited convergence

The decade from 2015 to 2024 was a period of major overall labour market change. Employment increased strongly in many European countries, especially after the post-pandemic recovery. Occupational structures also changed, with a gradual decline in elementary occupations and an expansion of more highly skilled jobs.

Migrants participated in this transformation. Their educational attainment improved: in EU14 countries, the share of tertiary-educated migrants increased from about 26% in 2015 to almost 32% in 2024, and their employment probability also increased. At the same time, the share of migrants in more high-skilled occupations increased from about 29% to 34%., whereas the share working in elementary occupations declined (21.5% vs 18.5%). These changes indicate that immigrant integration is not stagnant. In absolute terms, migrants are more educated, more likely to work, and more likely to be employed in high-skilled occupations than they were a decade ago. However, natives improved as well, often by as much or more. In EU14 countries, the share of tertiary-educated natives increased from about 30% to 38%. Native employment rose by more than six percentage points. High-skilled employment also expanded among natives, from about 46% to 50%. As a result, relative convergence was much more limited than absolute progress might suggest. The migrant-native employment gap in EU14 countries remained close to ten percentage points in both 2015 and 2024. Adjusting for age, gender, and education reduces the gap only moderately, suggesting that observable characteristics explain only part of migrants’ employment disadvantage.

Figure 2 Migrant–native employment gap in 2015 and 2024 in EU14 countries

The aggregate gap hides a compositional shift

The composition of the immigrant population changed markedly over the decade. As shown in Figure 3, in EU14 countries, migrants born in another EU country accounted for 35% of the foreign-born population in 2015. By 2024, this share had fallen to less than 28%. Thus, the share of migrants from outside the EU correspondingly increased. 

Figure 3 Distribution of migrants by area of origin in EU14 countries, 2015 and 2024

This shift is important because EU and non-EU migrants face very different labour market outcomes. EU migrants have employment rates close to those of natives. In 2024, their employment probability in Europe was only about two percentage points lower than that of natives. For non-EU migrants, the gap was much larger, around eleven percentage points. At the EU14 level, the employment gap for EU-born migrants was about three percentage points in 2015 and remained broadly unchanged by 2024. For non-EU migrants, the gap was around 13 percentage points in 2015 but narrowed to less than 12 percentage points in 2024.

Figure 4 Immigrant-native employment gaps in EU14 countries, by EU and non-EU origin, 2015 and 2024

This distinction changes the interpretation of the aggregate pattern. Because non-EU migrants have larger employment disadvantages, their growing share would, other things equal, have widened the overall migrant-native employment gap. The fact that the aggregate gap remained stable therefore reflects some improvement in the relative labour market position of non-EU migrants.

A stable aggregate gap can therefore conceal progress. It can also conceal heterogeneity. Denmark, Sweden, and Slovenia recorded reductions in the employment gap. In Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and Portugal the gap widened, largely because native employment increased especially strongly rather than because migrant employment collapsed. Country context remains central to understanding integration outcomes.

Duration of residence also matters. In 2024, recent migrants faced much larger employment gaps than migrants who had been in the host country for more than five years. This is especially true for recent non-EU migrants. Some of this pattern likely reflects the time needed to acquire host-country language skills, understand local labour markets, and transfer qualifications. It may also reflect selective return or onward migration.

Beyond employment: The job-quality gap

Employment is only one dimension of economic integration. The type of job migrants hold is also crucial. Migrants who work in jobs that do not use their skills are integrated into employment, but not necessarily into an occupational position that reflects their productivity or education.

In 2024, immigrants were more concentrated than natives in lower-status and lower-paid occupations. Across Europe, immigrants were about 12 percentage points more likely than natives to work in elementary occupations. They were also less likely to work in the three highest-paid occupational categories: managers, professionals, and associate professionals.

The decade brought some improvement, as we show in Figure 5, where we measure occupational quality using the Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), which ranks occupations according to their typical education and earnings levels. The measure is standardised within each country, so that differences can be compared across national labour markets. In EU14 countries, the average occupational-status gap between migrants and natives declined only slightly from about 0.42 standard deviations in 2015 to 0.40 in 2024. However, when comparing migrants and natives with similar age, gender, and education profiles, the reduction in the gap relative to the baseline – unconditional – comparison is stronger in 2024 (about a 40% reduction) than in 2015 (about a 30% reduction). This suggests that migrants’ occupational allocation improved relative to comparable natives, even though a large gap remains.

Figure 5 Baseline and adjusted migrant-native occupational quality gaps in EU14 countries, 2015 and 2024

The job-quality dimension is particularly important because educational differences explain only part of the gap. Many migrants have qualifications that are not fully rewarded in host-country labour markets. Previous evidence for Europe shows that highly educated migrants are often overqualified for their jobs, a form of ‘brain waste’ that reduces both individual returns to migration and the efficiency of skill allocation (Dalmonte and Frattini 2024).

The persistence of occupational gaps points to barriers that go beyond formal education: recognition of foreign qualifications, host-country language proficiency, access to regulated professions, employer networks, discrimination, and limited occupational mobility. These barriers are likely to be more severe for migrants from outside the EU.

Policy implications

The evidence suggests that immigrant integration in Europe is neither stagnant nor automatic. Migrants have made progress over the past decade. They are more numerous, more educated, more likely to be employed, and less concentrated in elementary occupations than in 2015. Yet relative gaps with natives remain sizeable. Integration policies should therefore be evaluated not only by whether migrants enter employment, but also by whether they move into jobs that use their skills. Early labour market access, language training, job search assistance, and placement in strong labour markets can improve refugee and migrant integration outcomes (Hasager et al. 2022, Abbiati et al. 2025). But the next margin is occupational mobility: helping migrants move from first jobs into better jobs. Policies should also recognise heterogeneity. EU and non-EU migrants face different constraints. National labour markets also differ sharply in their capacity to absorb immigrants into employment and into higher-status occupations.

The main lesson from the last decade is therefore one of progress without full convergence. European labour markets have absorbed a larger foreign-born population, and migrants have benefited from employment growth and occupational upgrading. But the remaining gaps are large enough to matter for earnings, productivity, and social mobility. If migration is to help Europe respond to demographic change and labour market needs, integration policy must move beyond access to work and address the quality of work as well.

References

Abbiati, G, E Battistin, P Monti and P Pinotti (2025), “Early job mentoring, placement, and training boost refugee integration without high costs”, VoxEU.org, 10 July.

Caselli, F, A Gloe Dizioli and F Toscani (2024), “Macroeconomic implications of the recent surge of immigration to the EU”, VoxEU.org, 14 October.

Dalmonte, A and T Frattini (2024), “Skilled but struggling: The ‘brain waste’ dilemma of migrants in Europe”, VoxEU.org, 13 August.

Frattini, T and A Bouchlaghem (2026), Immigrant Integration in Europe: 10th Migration Observatory Report, CEPR Press.

García Guzmán, P, F Coelli and E Nilsson (2025), “The scale and limits of migration in offsetting population ageing”, VoxEU.org, 5 December.

Hasager, L, G Peri and M Foged (2022), “Language training and placement in strong labour markets promote refugees’ long-run economic integration”, VoxEU.org, 11 December.

Van Herck, K, Á Kiss and A Turrini (2026), “The rise and fall of EU labour shortages: Recent developments and some forward-looking considerations”, VoxEU.org, 26 March.