Michael Pettis frequently claims that, by running large surpluses, China is forcing “the demand-suppressing cost of their policies onto their trading partners.” The idea here is relatively straightforward: by disincentivizing consumption within China, China’s policies are reducing domestic demand, which, ceteris paribus, reduces global demand.

The problem with this logic should be fairly obvious: ceteris is not in fact paribus. It assumes other countries passively hold their own demand fixed in response to suppressed Chinese demand. But if that were the case, we should expect to see excess unemployment in the rest of the world in response to rising Chinese surpluses.

The empirical record decisively rejects this prediction: both US and EU unemployment was falling during China Shock 1.0 (2000-08), and post-2021 we’ve seen falling unemployment in the EU and stable full-employment in the US.

Monetary policy in other countries adjusts, preventing any shortfall of demand. The more sophisticated version of this argument recognizes that it only bites if other countries are constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB). In that case, monetary policy cannot lower interest rates to offset a fall in demand elsewhere in the world.

But reports of the death of domestic demand levers at the ZLB have been greatly exaggerated. The monetary authority can raise the inflation target, implement (NGDP or price) level targeting, use forward guidance, and open up the spigots on QE. Furthermore, fiscal policy remains an adequate tool for boosting demand.

That is from J. Zachary Mazlish, the rest of the post has separate interesting points about China shock 2.0