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Two easyJet Airbus A320 flights operating from London Luton Airport (LTN) and Manchester Airport (MAN) were involved in separate serious takeoff incidents weeks apart after departing from runway positions that differed from those used in the crews’ takeoff performance calculations. In both cases, the aircraft used a different runway entry point from that assumed during pre-flight planning, reducing the amount of runway available for departure and resulting in a mismatch between the aircraft’s actual takeoff position and the data being used by the flight crew.
The incidents have drawn attention following the release of an Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) report into the London Luton occurrence. The report detailed the sequence of events that led to the departure and examined the operational circumstances surrounding the incident. It also highlighted similarities with a separate easyJet A320 event at Manchester that occurred weeks later and involved a comparable discrepancy between runway position and takeoff assumptions.
AAIB Findings On The easyJet Airbus A320 Luton Incident
The first incident involved easyJet flight EZY2335 from London Luton Airport to Málaga Airport (AGP) on June 13, 2025. The flight was operated by an Airbus A320-214, registration G-EZUK, carrying 180 passengers and six crew members. According to the AAIB report, the crew initially intended to depart from Intersection Alpha on Runway 25 and completed performance calculations using electronic flight bags (EFBs).
During flight preparation, however, the crew determined that the aircraft’s operating conditions required a full-length departure instead of an intersection departure. Reports stated that the aircraft’s weight was approximately 151,870 lb (68,887 kg) and that the available performance margins from the intersection were insufficient under the conditions at the time. The crew recalculated performance data for a full-length departure.
Despite the revised calculations, the aircraft later lined up at the intersection position and commenced takeoff from there rather than from the full runway length. According to the AAIB, the aircraft crossed the end of the runway at approximately 65 ft (19 meters) above ground level before continuing normally to Malaga. The discrepancy was not identified during departure and was instead detected later by the airline’s Flight Data Monitoring system. The AAIB report summary states:
“The crew calculated takeoff performance to depart using the full-length of the runway, but the aircraft departed from a runway intersection, ie with a shorter take off run. The crew did not notice this during the takeoff roll but it was identified later the same day by the operator’s Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) system.”
Similar Circumstances Emerged At Manchester
AviationA2Z reported that weeks after the Luton occurrence, a second easyJet Airbus A320 was involved in a similar incident at Manchester Airport. The event took place on July 6, 2025, and involved a flight from Manchester to Kos International Airport (KGS), Greece.
Reporting on the incident stated that the aircraft departed from a runway position that differed from the assumptions used in the crew’s takeoff performance calculations. Similar to the Luton event, the issue related to the aircraft’s departure position rather than the use of an entirely incorrect runway.
While a formal AAIB report into the Manchester event had not been released at the time of writing, the incident attracted attention because of its similarity to the Luton occurrence.
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Human Factors And Procedural Safeguards
The AAIB report concluded that the A320 was prepared for departure slightly ahead of schedule and that no external pressures or distractions were identified that would have contributed to the crew rushing or omitting required procedures for a full-length departure from Runway 25. Although operational considerations such as the aircraft’s higher-than-normal weight were included in the crew brief, the requirement to depart from the full runway length rather than the more commonly used intersection was not sufficiently reinforced during pre-departure planning.
Following pushback, the commander requested taxi clearance and was asked by air traffic control whether the aircraft was able to depart from the intersection. The crew confirmed that they were able to do so, a response that the report associated with habitual behavior due to recent use of the intersection. This exchange was not challenged or corrected during subsequent cockpit actions. The AAIB also noted that additional situational cues, including another aircraft stating they required the full runway length shortly before the frequency change, did not lead to a reassessment of the departure position, with workload during taxi and departure likely contributing.
The report further identified that the crew’s expectation of an intersection departure was reinforced by repeated exposure to other aircraft using the same intersection, contributing to confirmation bias. A final performance cross-check step relied on memory and did not require a direct comparison between calculated takeoff data and the actual departure position. Consequently, the discrepancy between the intended full-length departure and the intersection departure was not identified before takeoff. Following the event, the operator revised its takeoff performance procedures to strengthen verification processes and reduce reliance on memory, with the aim of improving resilience against similar errors.
