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A major pilots’ union has warned that a cockpit defect linked to unexpected engine shutdowns on Airbus aircraft could have potentially catastrophic consequences, urging regulators to broaden their response after the issue emerged on more than one type. The warning comes after investigators linked separate incidents involving an Air New Zealand Airbus A320neo and a British Airways Airbus A350 to the same cockpit control assembly.
While European regulators have already acted to address the issue, the British Air Line Pilots’ Association (BALPA) argues the risk extends beyond the aircraft originally covered by safety directives. The emergence of a similar event on the A350 has since prompted the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to expand its response, highlighting how a seemingly minor cockpit component can have implications across multiple Airbus families.
The Air New Zealand Incident That Started It All
The chain of events began in December 2024 with an Air New Zealand Airbus A320neo that suffered an unexpected engine shutdown about 15 minutes after departure from Wellington Airport (WLG). The crew was able to divert safely to 
Auckland Airport (AKL), with no injury to the 142 passengers and six crew members on board, but investigators from New Zealand’s Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC) were left puzzled by how an engine could have shut down mid-flight without any deliberate action by the pilots.
Their investigation quickly focused on one of the most safety-critical controls in the cockpit: the engine fire shutoff switch. This is a physical cockpit control that sits high on the overhead panel, recessed and guarded, and is not part of the normal scan unless a fire warning is active. It works in conjunction with Airbus’s Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM), which continuously monitors aircraft systems and guides pilots through abnormal and emergency procedures.
In the event of an engine fire or severe damage, ECAM presents the appropriate checklist, but the engine is not isolated automatically — the crew must manually pull and activate the fire shutoff control, which closes the fuel shutoff valve and isolates hydraulic, pneumatic and electrical systems associated with that engine. Investigators found that a retaining pin had become bent during installation, allowing normal vibration to activate the switch mechanism unintentionally.
This raised significant concerns, because it meant that a fault within the control itself was able to initiate engine isolation actions without the pilots intentionally commanding them, resulting in an engine being shut down mid-flight solely due to the movement of the aircraft. This discovery transformed what initially appeared to be an isolated technical failure into a broader safety concern, as the affected component was common across thousands of A320 aircraft. That resulted in the Airworthiness Directive EASA AD 2025-0274R1, which requires operators of affected Airbus A320-family aircraft to inspect the integrated control panels.
Then It Happened Again On A Different Airbus
The issue might have remained confined to the A320 family had a similar event not occurred on a 
British Airways Airbus A350-1000. A flight operating from Las Vegas’ 
Harry Reid International Airport (LAS) to 
London Heathrow Airport (LHR) was at cruise over Halifax, Canada, when the right engine suddenly lost power.
Although the aircraft belongs to a completely different Airbus family, investigators identified the same integrated control panel as the source of concern. That immediately raised questions about whether the original regulatory action focused on the A320neo family had gone far enough.
How The Safety Response Escalated | ||
|---|---|---|
Category | Air New Zealand Event | British Airways Event |
Operator | Air New Zealand | British Airways |
Aircraft | Airbus A320neo | Airbus A350-1000 |
Aircraft family | A320 family | A350 family |
Event | Unexpected engine shutdown | Similar uncommanded engine shutdown event |
Root cause | Bent retaining pin in integrated control panel | Same integrated control panel issue identified |
Crew outcome | Safe diversion and landing | Crew managed event safely |
Initial regulatory response | EASA Airworthiness Directive for A320-family aircraft | EASA Proposed Airworthiness Directive for A350 family |
Wider implication | Initially considered an A320-family issue | Demonstrates that the issue may extend across multiple Airbus families |
Rather than dismissing the A350 event as unrelated, EASA has since issued a Proposed Airworthiness Directive 26-087 covering Airbus A350-900 and A350-1000 aircraft equipped with the affected integrated control panels. The proposal calls for inspections in accordance with an Airbus service bulletin, demonstrating that regulators now believe the same unsafe condition may also exist on the A350 fleet.
The sequence of events has significantly changed the conversation. What began as an isolated incident involving a single A320neo has now become a cross-fleet safety issue involving both narrowbody and widebody Airbus aircraft. For BALPA, which represents flight crew at several airlines, including British Airways, Virgin Atlantic, and easyJet, the second occurrence suggests that the underlying design or installation issue deserves broader attention wherever the same cockpit hardware is installed.
Why Pilots Want Broader Action
BALPA has issued statements saying that it believes the issue requires increased focus, giving a range of supporting reasons. The first is the criticality of the engine fire shutoff switch, which is among the most protected controls in an Airbus cockpit, because activating it isolates the engine from fuel, hydraulics and other essential systems. As a result, it is intentionally designed to require deliberate pilot action. The fact that a protected cockpit control could activate without the crew intending it to do so is a grave concern.
Secondly, while BALPA acknowledges that the likelihood of another uncommanded shutdown as low, it stresses that if it were to happen, it is something that would be easy for the pilots to miss:
“When the switch releases mechanically, the visual cue is subtle – especially at night in a darkened cockpit – although you might hear a slight click as it releases. This makes a popped fire switch surprisingly easy to overlook.”
While modern twin-engine airliners are certified to fly safely following the loss of one engine, BALPA argues that while the risk of another incident is low, the consequences are not. They range from challenging in cruise, to hazardous during initial climb, and critical if the switch releases at V1, when a takeoff is already committed. The union goes on to say:
“Because the defect is completely latent and may initially produce confusing or incomplete ECAM indications, we consider the potential severity to be high to potentially catastrophic — particularly if crews misidentify the problem.”
Regulators have responded by requiring inspections rather than grounding aircraft, reflecting the view that the risk can be effectively managed through maintenance. Nevertheless, the long compliance window on AD 2025-0274 feels uncomfortable, and the appearance of the same issue across multiple Airbus families illustrates how seemingly small components can have fleet-wide implications. As airlines work through the required inspections, BALPA’s warning serves as a reminder that identifying latent defects before they result in an incident remains one of the aviation industry’s most important safety defenses.
