A massive demographic shift is unfolding across the globe. Even as global population growth slows, about 1.2 billion young people in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) will reach working age between 2025 and 2035 – more than in any previous youth cohort, and more than projected for any future decade (Figure 1A; see also United Nations 2024). Creating enough productive jobs for these young men and women will be a defining test for policy makers. Global surveys show that employment is already among people’s top concerns (Gallup 2026). Yet this record youth cohort also represents an enormous opportunity: with the right policies and investments, today’s young people can become a powerful force for global growth and prosperity for decades to come (Chrimes et al. 2026).

Figure 1 The youth surge in EMDEs

 Sources: UN World Population Prospects (2024); World Bank.
Note: EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA = Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan; SAR = South Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. Bars show the number of young working-age people (aged 15–24), living in EMDEs (A) or EMDE regions (B) in each year. 

How is the youth surge distributed across regions? 

All EMDE regions will see large numbers of young people reaching working age over the next decade. Within the 1.2 billion total, the largest numbers will be in sub-Saharan Africa with about 330 million; East Asia and the Pacific, with around 280 million; and South Asia, also with around 280 million. The Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan will account for around 170 million, while Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean will between them contribute around 165 million.  About 270 million young working-age people will live in places currently classified as fragile and conflict-affected situations, where creating jobs is especially difficult – and especially urgent.

The regional distribution of young people has shifted markedly over recent decades (Lam and Leibbrandt 2023). In 2000, one-third of all 15-24 year-olds across EMDEs lived in East Asia and the Pacific; by 2035, this share is expected to fall below one-quarter. In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa’s share is projected to rise from 14% in 2000 to 27% in 2035, reflecting a sharp increase in the number of young people entering working age (Figure 1B). Although that sharp increase is daunting, it brings the possibility of a large potential demographic dividend for the continent, if supported by the right policies (Kuhn et al. 2016). 

Why is it more difficult to address the jobs challenge today? 

This youth surge is arriving against a difficult global economic backdrop. EMDE potential growth in the 2020s is estimated to be one-third lower than it was in the 2000s (Figure 2A; see also Kilic Celik et al. 2023, Kose and Ohnsorge 2024). Investment has been persistently weak (Adarov 2025). Fiscal positions are strained, and geopolitical risk has reached multi-decade highs in 2026 (World Bank 2026). Despite showing some recent resilience, global trade growth in the 2020s is expected to average 2.8% – less than half the average rate in the 1990s. Even before recent overlapping shocks, recorded employment growth had fallen short of projected growth in the working-age population over the coming decade in many countries, including almost all sub-Saharan African economies (Figure 2B). This underscores the scale of the challenge in sub-Saharan Africa, which is projected to see its largest-ever influx of young people over the next decade, comparable to that faced by East Asia and Pacific in the decade ending in 1988 (Figure 3A). 

Figure 2 Growth prospects and employment growth

Sources: ILOSTAT (https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/); Kose and Ohnsorge (2024); UN World Population Prospects (2024); World Bank.
Note: AEs = advanced economies; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA = Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan; SAR = South Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.  A. Bars show GDP-weighted annual averages. Sample includes 53 EMDEs and 30 advanced economies. B. Bars show the share of economies in each region that are projected to have higher working-age population growth over 2025–35 (number of people, on average, per year) than annual employment growth over 2010–19 (number of jobs, on average, per year).  

A series of overlapping crises has also reduced the scope for policy action, particularly in low-income countries (Mawejje 2025). Against a backdrop of rising trade and geopolitical tensions, export-led growth strategies that underpinned development in some EMDEs in the past may be harder to execute going forward, even though there may be alternative opportunities for welfare-enhancing trade. Structural shifts, including emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, offer new opportunities but also introduce fresh uncertainty about job creation prospects (World Bank 2026).

Figure 3 Regional peak youth surges and the importance of investment growth in EMDEs

Sources: Haver Analytics; ILOSTAT (https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/); WDI (https://databank.worldbank.org/ source/world-development-indicators); UN World Population Prospects (2024); World Bank.
Note: EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA = Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan; SAR = South Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. A. Bars show each region’s peak inflow of young people to working age, as measured by the number of people aged 15–24 at the end of the period. B. Bars show group medians. “Low” and “High” indicate annual investment growth in the bottom and top third of the distribution. Differences in median employment growth are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Sample includes 69 EMDEs from 2000–23.  

What policy interventions can help accelerate job growth? 

The best policy mix for creating jobs at scale will vary with each country’s comparative advantages and institutional capacity. But three pillars can provide a common platform for stronger investment and job creation: delivering foundational infrastructure, including human capital; fostering a business-enabling environment, underpinned by macroeconomic stability and efficient regulation; and mobilizing private capital. A sustained increase in investment growth is likely to be essential. Economies that have achieved faster investment growth since 2000 have also tended to record substantially stronger employment growth (Figure 3B). 

History shows that these policy pillars can make a difference. Evidence from Australia, Chile, Colombia, Korea, and Singapore – economies that experienced episodes of sustained increases in employment growth and the share of adults in work – points to the relevance of targeted policy interventions. During these episodes, average employment growth reached 3.4%, roughly double its pace in other years. Investment expanded at nearly four times its pace in other years, output growth was about 50% higher, and productivity rose at roughly twice the rate, highlighting mutually reinforcing gains from capital accumulation, growth, and efficiency.

These episodes also illustrate how the three pillars can support job creation at scale. Foundational infrastructure – physical, human, and digital – was often central. Chile and Colombia used infrastructure networks to develop natural-resource sectors, while Singapore’s rise as a logistics and financial hub built on sustained investments in infrastructure and skills. Korea and Singapore moved up value chains through innovation and human capital, including private-sector-led R&D in Korea and expanded tertiary education in Singapore. A stronger business environment and greater private capital mobilization also mattered, with case studies noting regulatory and macroeconomic reforms, labor market flexibility, pension and financial sector reforms, public-private partnerships, and deeper capital markets, which can all help sustain investment-led job creation.

The international community has a key role in helping countries to address the jobs challenge. A supportive and cooperative international economic environment can help build space for durable economic expansion. Targeted concessional financing and capacity development can help advance these three pillars and create the conditions for sustained job creation. Sharing knowledge and expertise can also help policy makers develop effective solutions. The World Bank Group has put job creation at the center of its focus, recognising that jobs are central to economic self-sufficiency, poverty reduction, and global stability (Banga 2025). 

Successfully addressing the jobs challenge would be transformational, but job creation is not the only employment-related priority facing policymakers. Driving productivity and wage growth, addressing informality, and ensuring adequate working conditions, and well-calibrated social support are also important – and should be pursued alongside efforts to expand employment opportunities. Productive employment is the critical link between economic growth and rising living standards. Historical examples and policy frameworks offer reasons for optimism, but the greatest source of hope is young people themselves: the generation set to reach working age over the next decade is full of potential and better educated than previous cohorts. This generation could deliver a substantial demographic dividend, advancing development progress and helping to reinvigorate the global economy, but only if sufficient job opportunities are created.

References

Adarov, A (ed) (2025), Accelerating Investment: Challenges and Policies, World Bank.

Banga, A (2025), “Development is How we Compete, Grow, and Stay Secure”, Financial Times, 1 April. 

Chrimes, T, M A Kose, and K Stamm (eds.) (2026), The Global Jobs Challenge, World Bank.

Gallup (2026), The World’s Most Important Problem: What People Need Leaders to Hear in 2026.

Kilic Celik, S, M A Kose, F Ohnsorge, and F Ruch (2023), “A New Cross-Country Database of Potential Growth,” VoxEU.org, 21 December. 

Kose, M A and F Ohnsorge (eds) (2024), Falling Long-Term Growth Prospects: Trends, Expectations, and Policies, World Bank.

Kuhn, M, K Prettner, and D Bloom (2016), “Africa’s Prospects for Enjoying a Demographic Dividend,” VoxEU.org, 20 October. 

Lam, D and M Leibbrandt (2023), “Demographic Challenges for Global Labor Markets in the 21st Century: Africa in a Changing World”, Working Paper 303, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.

Mawejje, J (2025), Fiscal Vulnerabilities in Low-Income Countries: Evolution, Drivers, and Policies, World Bank.

United Nations (2024), “World Population Prospects 2024”, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https:// population.un.org/dataportal/

World Bank (2026), Global Economic Prospects, June.