Recent research shows that rising immigration increases polarisation of attitudes towards immigrants through media coverage (Schneider-Strawczynski and Valette 2025) and increases support for anti-immigration laws (Tabellini 2020), potentially shaping electoral outcomes. Prior studies have examined the political consequences of immigration across different contexts. The findings are mixed, however, and depend on various factors, including the host country and the characteristics of the migrants.  For instance, Halla et al. (2017) show that while low-skilled migrants may increase support for right-wing parties, the presence of high-skilled migrants has a negative effect. Similar patterns of immigration-driven support for right-wing parties have been documented in Italy (Barone et al. 2016) and the UK (Fasani et al. 2025). Dustmann et al. (2019) show that characteristics of the local area also influence how migration affects political outcomes, while Steinmayr (2021) finds that it also matters whether refugees only pass through an area temporarily or settle there. Furthermore, Hatton (2017) argues, it is the salience of immigration and not just preferences over its level that matter. Public salience of immigration, rather than simply its absolute level, tends to be what fundamentally shapes political attitudes.

In recent years, far-right parties have increasingly focused their anti-immigrant rhetoric on refugees’ access to social welfare systems, consistent with findings that immigration can decrease native support for redistribution (Alesina et al. 2019). In our new paper (Mykhailyshyna and Zuchowski 2025), we examine two migration shocks with differing access to social welfare systems. Specifically, we shed light on the impact of Ukrainian migration on the political landscape in Poland. This context allows us to distinguish between the effects of two types of migration. First, we analyse the political effects of the inflow of Ukrainian temporary workers who came to Poland in search of better economic opportunities after the destabilisation of the Ukrainian economy due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, but who did not have direct access to social benefits. Second, we examine the effects of the inflow of Ukrainian refugees who came to Poland after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and had direct access to social benefits.

To examine the causal impact of the Ukrainian migration on voting behaviour in Poland, we exploit the spatial variation in the exposure to Ukrainian migrants across Polish counties. For identification, we use three instrumental variables: (1) distance to historical hotspots of Ukrainian networks (IV: Akcja Wisla), (2) distance to the Ukrainian border (IV: Border), and (3) a novel instrument based on distance to Polish cities that hosted UEFA Euro 2012 matches (IV: Euro 2012). Our results are robust to the use of all three instruments and several sensitivity checks.

We find that the two migration shocks have different effects. Figure 1 shows that exposure to labour migration initially reduces support for conservative parties and then shifts voter support to pro-redistribution parties. Our evidence on mechanisms, as well as Zuchowski (2025), suggests a positive impact of Ukrainian temporary workers on local economic conditions. We argue that the positive economic effect of migration likely explains our main results: locals sought to benefit from the improved economic situation, which led to a decline in their support for conservative parties which are less supportive of migration compared to liberal parties, reflecting a preference for greater openness in the country. Subsequently, they voted for pro-redistribution parties to secure a stronger safety net and ensure that locals, rather than migrants reap most of the benefits.

Figure 1 Ukrainian labour migration and political outcomes in Poland

Notes: Panels (a), (b), and (c) present the results for parliamentary elections in 2015, 2019, and 2023, respectively. Coefficients are depicted with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the refugee inflow on voting behaviour in Poland. We find no significant effect on support for either pro-redistribution or conservative parties in response to refugee migration. We argue that the lack of an effect on pro-redistribution parties can be attributed to refugees’ eligibility for social benefits. Furthermore, the lack of an effect on support for conservative parties may be explained by both conservative and liberal parties initially adopting a similar stance towards Ukrainian refugees.

Figure 2 Ukrainian refugee inflow and political outcomes in Poland

Notes: This figure presents the results for parliamentary elections 2023. Coefficients are depicted with 95% confidence intervals.

Figures 1 and 2 also show that regions more exposed to both types of Ukrainian migration experience a decline in voting for the Polish far-right party, Konfederacja. However, this effect only emerges after the salience of Ukrainian migration increases, following the large inflow of refugees due to the escalation of Russia’s aggression in 2022. We argue that this shift is due to Konfederacja’s opposition to Ukrainian migrants, which began after the 2022 refugee inflow. In particular, during the 2023 election campaign, Konfederacja used anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, with a key focus on government spending for aid to Ukrainian refugees. Furthermore, the Polish far-right incorporated nationalist slogans such as “Let Poland be Polish” (Konfederacja 2025) or “Poland only for Poles” (OKO.press 2023), clearly highlighting an anti-immigrant stance beyond opposition to welfare policies.

This ultra-nationalist narrative of Konfederacja, directly targeting Ukrainians, could have led to a decrease in voting for the far-right among the local population who had positive experiences with Ukrainians. As a result, the far-right’s anti-Ukrainian rhetoric began to deter Polish voters once Ukrainian migration became more prominent in the far-right discourse following the 2022 refugee inflow. In particular, the previous positive experience with temporary labour migrants and the successful integration of Ukrainian refugees into Polish labour markets (Zyzik et al. 2023, Vezina et al. 2025, Zuchowski 2025) may have contributed to the Polish population in regions with higher exposure to Ukrainian migration being less susceptible to right-wing propaganda. 

Our results are in line with Allport’s contact hypothesis, suggesting that local exposure to refugees can reduce prejudice among the native population (Allport et al., 1954), and therefore decrease support for far-right parties. Interestingly, the backlash among Polish voters against the far-right is ten times stronger in areas exposed to refugees than in those exposed to labour migrants. On the one hand, this could suggest that exposure to refugees played a stronger role than exposure to labour migrants. On the other hand, despite not being directed at Konfederacja, public protests by Ukrainian refugees advocating for support for Ukraine may potentially have further discouraged support for the far-right. 

The political shifts coinciding with migration movements call for a better understanding of political effects of immigration. Our findings suggest that the impact of immigration on voting behaviour was primarily influenced by economic factors prior to the massive inflow of refugees. However, non-economic factors related to the contact hypothesis became more important when the salience of the Ukrainian migrants increased. Specifically, the significantly greater salience of the refugee inflow relative to that of labour migrants can explain the difference in the timing and magnitude of the effects. This finding is in line, for instance, with recent research showing that media coverage influences how immigration affects public attitudes (Schneider-Strawczynski and Valette 2025).

References

Alesina, A, E Murard and H Rapoport (2019), “Immigration and preferences for redistribution in Europe”, VoxEU.org, 8 April.

Allport, G W, K Clark and T Pettigrew (1954), The nature of prejudice, Addison-Wesley.

Barone, G, A D’Ignazio, G de Blasio and P Naticchioni (2016), “Immigration and natives’ voting behaviour: The case of Italy”, VoxEU.org, 19 April.

Dustmann, C, Vasiljeva, K and Piil Damm, A (2019), “Refugee migration and electoral outcomes”, The Review of Economic Studies 86(5): 2035–2091.

Fasani, F and A Romarri (2026), “The politics of asylum: How local exposure reshaped UK voting”, VoxEU.org, 5 January.

Halla, M, A F Wagner and J Zweimüller (2017), “Immigration and voting for the far right”, Journal of the European Economic Association 15(6): 1341–1385.

Hatton, T (2017), “Public attitudes to immigration: Salience matters”, VoxEU.org, 20 June.

Konfederacja (2025), “Zeby Polska byla polska. Zeby Polacy byli u siebie na swoim”.

Mykhailyshyna, D and D Zuchowski (2025), “Migration shocks and voting: Evidence from Ukrainian migration to Poland”, SSRN Working Paper.

OKO.press (2023), “Zobacz prawdziwa twarz Konfederacji. Wrocily antyukrainskie i antyunijne hasla”.

Schneider-Strawczynski, S and J Valette (2025), “Media coverage of immigration and the polarization of attitudes”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 17(1): 337–368.

Steinmayr, A (2021), “Contact versus exposure: Refugee presence and voting for the far right”, Review of Economics and Statistics 103(2): 310–327.

Tabellini, M (2020), “Gifts of the immigrants, woes of the natives: Lessons from the age of mass migration”, The Review of Economic Studies 87(1): 454–486.

Vezina, P, C G Aksoy and P Lewandowski (2025), “Refugee entrepreneurs as business multipliers: Evidence from Ukrainians in Poland”, VoxEU.org, 19 December.

Zuchowski, D (2025). “Migration response to an immigration shock: evidence from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine”, Journal of Economic Geography 25(1): 21–40.

Zyzik, R, L Baszczak, I Rozbicka and M Wielechowski (2023), “Uchodzcy z Ukrainy na polskim rynku pracy: mozliwosci i przeszkody”, Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny.