Concerning details emerged Tuesday afternoon during the second public update provided by the NTSB, following the fatal collision of
Air Canada Express Flight 8646 with a firetruck on the runway at
LaGuardia Airport (LGA). The briefing, given by NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy, was provided after the agency’s first full day on the scene, and confirmed that the aircraft’s Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) have been recovered and sent to Washington, DC for analysis.
While Homendy emphasized that it is still very early in the agency’s investigation, she highlighted two immediate areas of concern that the NTSB has already uncovered. The first is that the airport’s Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X), designed to prevent runway incursions and ground collisions, failed to warn air traffic controllers of the impending disaster because it was “unable to alert”. Part of the reason for that relates to the second concern: Truck One, which was struck by the CRJ-900 that had just landed, did not have a transponder.
The Safety Equipment Failed To Alert Controllers
ASDE-X is a high-tech surveillance system used by air traffic controllers to track the movement of aircraft and vehicles on an airport’s surface, aimed at preventing runway incursions and ground collisions. The system collects and integrates data from multiple sensors including radar, transponders, and multilateration sensors, to create a single, seamless map of the airport. The system also includes “safety logic” software that predicts potential conflicts, which triggers immediate visual and audible alerts in the Air Traffic Control Tower.
Homendy revealed that the ASDE-X system installed at LaGuardia “did not alert controllers” to the impending collision. While there could be multiple reasons for that, a key issue is that Truck One, which caused the collision when crossing Runway 4, was not fitted with a transponder, and was being followed by multiple vehicles. As a result, the ASDE-X system was relying solely on surface radar, which produces less precise returns, which could have affected situational awareness.
Homendy says that she personally reviewed the ASDE-X playback, and it showed “two radar targets on Taxiway Delta” but that “they are two blobs… and we don’t see any of them go in front of the plane on the runway.” Clearly, one of those blobs did go in front of Flight 8646, so this suggests that the system’s accuracy was less than desirable. Homendy appeared to confirm this, saying that the initial analysis provided the following conclusion:
ASDE-X did not generate an alert due to the close proximity of the vehicles merging and un-merging near the runway, resulting in the inability to create a track of high confidence.
Six Seconds To React
Also at the briefing was Doug Brazy, the lead investigator for the incident, who read out a summary of events from the cockpit voice recorder. This served to confirm that the fire truck was indeed cleared to cross the runway before the collision. But it also indicated that about a minute before the collision, an airport vehicle made a radio transmission to the tower that was “stepped on” by another radio transmission, and the source of that radio transmission has yet to be identified.
The initial timeline read out by Brazy is as follows (note that time indicates the minutes/seconds prior to the end of the CVR recording):
|
Time |
Who |
Action |
Why It Matters |
|---|---|---|---|
|
3:07 |
Approach controller |
Instructed the flight to contact LaGuardia Tower. |
Marks the handoff from approach to tower during the final phase of the landing. |
|
2:45 |
Flight crew |
Lowered the landing gear. |
Shows the aircraft was configuring normally for landing. |
|
2:22 |
Flight crew |
Checked in with LaGuardia Tower. |
Establishes that the tower was now directly controlling the arrival. |
|
2:17 |
LaGuardia Tower |
Cleared the airplane to land on Runway 4 and advised it was number two for landing. |
Confirms the aircraft was formally cleared to land and sequenced into traffic. |
|
1:52 |
Flight crew |
Set flaps to 30 degrees. |
Indicates continued normal landing configuration. |
|
1:33 |
Flight crew |
Set flaps to 45 degrees. |
Shows the aircraft reached a fuller landing configuration as it continued descent. |
|
1:26 |
EGPWS |
Issued the 1,000-foot callout. |
Confirms the aircraft was descending through a standard final-approach altitude milestone. |
|
1:12 |
Flight crew |
Confirmed the landing checklist was complete. |
Suggests the crew considered the approach properly set up. |
|
1:03 |
Unidentified vehicle / radio traffic |
An airport vehicle transmitted to the tower, but the call was stepped on by another transmission and the second source remains unidentified. |
Highlights early radio congestion and uncertainty before the runway crossing sequence. |
|
0:54 |
Flight crew |
Acknowledged the aircraft was 500 feet above ground and on a stable approach. |
Indicates the flight was still stabilized shortly before touchdown. |
|
0:40 |
LaGuardia Tower |
Asked which vehicle needed to cross a runway. |
Shows the tower was actively sorting out vehicle movements during the final approach window. |
|
0:28 |
Truck One |
Made a radio transmission to the tower. |
Begins the key exchange involving the vehicle on or near the runway environment. |
|
0:26 |
LaGuardia Tower |
Acknowledged Truck One’s transmission. |
Confirms two-way communication was established with the vehicle. |
|
0:25 |
Truck One |
Requested to cross Runway 4 at Taxiway Delta. |
Identifies the exact runway crossing request at the center of the event. |
|
0:20 |
LaGuardia Tower |
Cleared Truck One and company to cross Runway 4 at Taxiway Delta. |
This is the critical clearance that put the vehicle movement in direct conflict with the landing aircraft’s runway. |
|
0:19 |
EGPWS |
Issued the 100-foot callout. |
Shows the aircraft was extremely close to touchdown when the crossing clearance was given. |
|
0:17 |
Truck One |
Read back the runway crossing clearance. |
Confirms the vehicle crew understood and accepted the clearance. |
|
0:14 |
EGPWS |
Issued the 50-foot callout. |
Underscores how little time remained before touchdown. |
|
0:12 |
EGPWS / LaGuardia Tower |
The aircraft received the 30-foot callout; at the same time, the tower instructed a Frontier flight to hold position. |
Illustrates multiple simultaneous transmissions in the final seconds, adding to workload and radio complexity. |
|
0:11 |
EGPWS |
Issued the 20-foot callout. |
Indicates the aircraft was moments from touchdown. |
|
0:10 |
EGPWS |
Issued the 10-foot callout. |
Marks the final seconds before the wheels contacted the runway. |
|
0:09 |
LaGuardia Tower |
Instructed Truck One to stop. |
Shows the tower recognized the danger only seconds before touchdown. |
|
0:08 |
Aircraft |
Sound consistent with the landing gear touching down on the runway. |
Pins down the likely touchdown moment relative to the stop command. |
|
0:06 |
Flight crew |
The First Officer, who was flying pilot, transferred control to the Captain. |
Suggests an unusual, last-second reaction by the pilots immediately after touchdown. |
|
0:04 |
LaGuardia Tower |
Again instructed Truck One to stop. |
Reinforces the urgency and confirms the conflict remained unresolved after touchdown. |
|
0:00 |
CVR recording |
Recording ended. |
Marks the endpoint of the sequence reviewed by investigators. |
This timeline also provides a clue about what might have happened inside the cockpit immediately after touchdown. The captain taking control of the aircraft from the first officer just two seconds after landing is unusual, and it likely this was in response to the impending disaster. However, he had just six seconds to react, not nearly enough time to halt the aircraft or to steer clear of the fire truck.
While passengers on board the flight reported heavier than usual braking, one of the key areas for the NTSB investigation will be the aircraft steering. On the Bombardier CRJ-900 there is only one tiller, located adjacent to the captain’s seat. So it is possible that the captain saw the fire truck just seconds before impact, took control, and attempted to steer the plane to the right, away from the truck that entered the runway from the left. The NTSB investigation will determine if that is indeed what occurred.
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Pilots Raised Concerns Before The Fatal Incident
Meanwhile, The Guardian reports that concerns about safety at LaGuardia had been raised well before Sunday’s fatal crash. Citing entries in NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System, the paper says pilots had filed anonymous reports warning about close calls, controller workload, and operational pressure at the airport.
“Please do something,” a pilot wrote last summer in one of dozens of recent reports, citing a close call when air traffic controllers failed to provide appropriate guidance about multiple nearby aircraft. Referring to the January 2025 mid-air collision over the Potomac River at
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), which killed more than 60 people, the pilot went on to say:
“The pace of operations is building in LGA. The controllers are pushing the line. On thunderstorm days, LGA is starting to feel like DCA did before the accident there.”
A different complaint from last summer described a particularly worrying moment when a departing aircraft was cleared for takeoff while another jet was only about 300 feet above the ground on final approach to the intersecting runway. The pilot said hazy conditions and possible helicopter traffic made the situation even more uncomfortable, and argued that guidance on how close aircraft can safely get in such scenarios appeared unclear. Yet another report outlined how a crew was cleared to cross a runway before realizing an arriving aircraft was heading toward them.
The crash of Air Canada Express Flight 8646 will undoubtedly place even greater scrutiny on these past reports, as the NTSB works through the causes for the accident. As Homendy said at the press conference:
“We rarely, if ever, investigate an accident where there was one failure. Our aviation system is incredibly safe because there are multiple layers of defense built in to prevent an accident. So when something goes wrong, that means many, many things went wrong”.
It is clear that even after its first day of investigation, the NTSB has already identified multiple things that went wrong, and it also have numerous past reports and complaints to analyze as well.








